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I.     Introduction 
Over the past ten to fifteen years, social scientists throughout the world have focussed a 
great deal of attention on the transformation of society in eastern and southeastern 
Europe. Initially, they concentrated on processes that had long been emerging and taking 
shape in Poland and Hungary. After 1985 the attempts to promote perestroika in the 
Soviet Union attracted increasing academic notice abroad. After the complete collapse of 
state socialism in eastern and southeastern Europe in 1989/1990, the accompanying 
processes of transformation became the subject of investigation from a comprehensive, 
national, and to some extent comparative perspective, primarily in empirical studies. The 
resulting literature now fills libraries and deserves generalising theoretical analysis. 
Social science literature, including that of earlier decades, has provided theoretical and 
methodological milestones on the road to a general sociological theory of societal 
transformation, also relevant for the far-reaching current processes and the wealth of 
empirical material available on eastern and southeastern Europe. It has dealt with various 
forms of societal transformation like the shift from feudalism to capitalism (from Marx to 
Braudel's socio-historical studies), from capitalism to the Soviet type of socialism (from 
Bucharin's "Economics of the Transformation Period" and Sorokin's "Sociology of 
Revolution" to Wittfogel's "Oriental Despotism" and Djilas' "The New Class"), with 
changes taking place within capitalist economic and societal systems (from the vast 
literature on imperialism to Mannheim's "Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction" 
and Polanyi's "The Great Transformation"), with the socio-economic dimensions of 
globalisation and with the world economy (Wallerstein), and with the development of a 
new, endogenous society, like Eisenstadt's "The Transformation of Israeli Society". To 
this extent, the transformation processes that eastern and southeastern Europe are 
currently experiencing are not only of academic interest in themselves. They give decisive 
impetus to a long-term line of research that is of both theoretical and practical relevance 
for the international social sciences. 
Two geographical complexes in eastern and southeastern Europe affected by 
transformation have received particular political and scholarly attention in recent years: 
the first candidates from the area for accession to the European Union (Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary) and, secondly, Russia and the other successor states to the USSR, 
particularly the Baltic countries and Ukraine. 
The particular salience of Russia in the transformation of eastern and southeastern Europe 
arises from its former, continuing, and certainly future role in the international economy 
and international politics (geopolitical coordinates; natural, economic, and intellectual 
resources; the singularity of its historical development over the past century; the search 
for a new profile in the national economic and social order, and its international role).* 
*  Cf. also: H. Steiner; Die Herausbildung neuer Sozialstrukturen im gegenwärtigen Rußland. 
,,Sitzungsberichte der LEIBNIZ-Sozietät", Bd. 41. Jahrgang 2000, H. 6, S. 5-72 
7 II.    Social Structural Results of Gorbachev's "Perestroika" 
The perestroika or restructuring of the Soviet social system initiated in 1985 by Michael 
Gorbachev pursued three essential objectives: first, the democratisation of political life, 
second a moderate replacement of political elites by open-minded and intellectual 
nomenklatura cadres, and, third, economic reform. In each field, decisions were made on the 
"trial and error" principle. This is apparent from the various moves towards economic reform: 
1985 
April 23  Communist Party Central Committee approves resolution to reform 
economic management. 
1986





May  USSR Law on Cooperatives allows private enterprises to be formed. 
December         USSR decree permits sale of state-owned apartments to individuals. 
April  USSR decree allows leasing of state enterprises by their workers. 
July 5  Gorbachev creates Commission on Economic Reform under Deputy 
Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin. 
July 6  Gorbachev tells Council of Europe that USSR will not block reforms in 
eastern Europe. 
October  Abalkin Commission presents a programme emphasizing a market 
economy, freeing of prices, competition, a convertible currency, and 
stock exchanges. 
January  Gorbachev tacitly allows the leasing of family farms. 
February  Grigory Yavlinskiy and others discuss a 500-day programme for 
transition to a market economy. 
March  Supreme Soviet of USSR passes law on property, with no mention of 
private ownership of land. 
June 4  Supreme Soviet of USSR passes Law on Enterprises, emphasizing a 
market economy. 
8 August  Group of economists under Stanislav Shatalin, convened jointly by 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin, develops 500-day plan for economic reform. 
August 9  USSR Council of Ministers (cabinet) legalizes private ownership of 
business. 
November         Russian Congress of People's Deputies adopts law authorizing 
family farms. 
December         Russian Congress of People's Deputies adopts Law on Land Reform. 
December 25    Russian Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity allows sole 
proprietorships, partnerships, and closed and open joint-stock 
corporations, and eliminates restrictions on their activities. 
1991 
January  Wholesale prices are freed but retail prices remain unchanged and 
subsidies to consumers rise. 
April 1  USSR increases consumer prices but also expands subsidies. 
June             Soviet Union considers but does not adopt Draft Law on Fundamental 
Principles of Destatization and Privatisation of Enterprises. 
July  Russian Housing Privatisation Act is adopted. 
July 3  Russian Supreme Soviet adopts Law on Privatisation of State and 
Municipal Enterprises and Law on Personal Privatisation Accounts. 
August 10         Gorbachev signs decree authorizing privatisation in USSR. 
August 18         Delegation of antireform Communists tries unsuccessfully to 
persuade Gorbachev to declare a state of emergency. 
August - September 
Most Soviet republics declare their independence. 
The highly contradictory and half-hearted privatisation and granting of economic autonomy 
in the years of perestroika produced the following end-of-year results: 
1989 10,000  apartments  privatised. 
1990  53,000 apartments and 4,432 family farms privatised. 
1991  175,000 apartments and 49,013 family farms privatised; 250,000 new 
small businesses founded. 
9 It was the beginning of independent middle classes through small-scale businesses and 
business relations ("malyi bisness"), which were subsequently to grow and spread regionally, 
but which have still not managed to have a stable or stabilising, let alone innovative impact on 
the economic and social structure of Russia. 
Numerous individual measures and decisions were taken to encourage and permit initiative 
and economic autonomy. But after decades of a total lack of any sort of private economic 
activity, the steps taken were concerned almost exclusively with promoting private agriculture 
for kolkhoz markets, with the retail and catering trades, and with services. At the same time, 
founding a business was often possible only if existing regulations were disregarded (e.g., 
how to open a restaurant while alcohol is completely prohibited?). 
One economic experiment introduced in the first years of perestroika was to grant so-called 
"Komsomol enterprises" rights and powers going beyond the usual planning requirements, 
especially those of the state export trade and foreign exchange monopolies, that had hitherto 
been strictly followed. For a certain number of enterprises, extraordinary independent 
decision-making powers were transferred to groups of Komsomol functionaries via the 
Central Committee of the Komsomol, in particular in international relations with banks and 
foreign trade bodies. 
On the one hand they were able to make direct use of these expanded, indeed unique 
preferential terms, and on the other they had a head start when privatisation was officially 
launched in 1991/92 and the market economy began. Above all, in buying and selling they 
were able to benefit from the different rates of exchange for the normal tourist ruble, the state 
clearing ruble, and the foreign exchange ruble, thus accumulating considerable assets in a 
short period of time. 
It is not by chance that a striking proportion of the upper echelons of the new Russian 
economic elites have been recruited from the Komsomol nomenklatura. 
Finally, in 1989/90 the Central Committee of the CPSU and all subordinate Party organs 
withdrew from management of the economy and their own economic activities. The powers 
of the economic sections of the Central Committee and of all subordinate units were 
transferred to state organs previously bound by instructions, i.e., the trade and industry 
ministries of the USSR government, the Union republics, and the relevant regional state 
organs. This was also the case for the business enterprises operated by the Party itself, such as 
the real estate, guest houses, vacation complexes, etc., usually in the best locations. The 
beneficiaries of these hasty and legally irregular transfers of ownership were Party and 
government politicians and functionaries and the managers of the enterprises and facilities 
concerned. To some extent the properties, guest houses and holiday accommodation were let 
to moneyed foreigners, resulting in the years that following in "Russian privatisation 
solutions" with covert foreign capital, which continue to affect ownership structures in the 
country. 
Just how contradictory the approach to economic reform was in the perestroika period is 
illustrated by the answers to a retrospective question on the effectiveness of Soviet economic 
10 
 management put in the 90s to executives from the oil industry, politicians, and members 
of the elites operating under Gorbachev. 
 
From an historical point of view, too, it is interesting that about 70% of business 
executives concerned, no less than 90% of politicians, and 60% of respondents from the 
Gorbachev elite believed the necessary economic reforms to be realisable within the Soviet 
state system. But 40% of the already modified Gorbachev elite considered the 
management of the (oil) industry to be totally ineffective and unreformable (only 23% of 
business executives and a mere 10% of the politicians in charge were of this opinion). 
In all, after five years of perestroika it was clear that it had proved impossible to introduce 
effective economic reforms or to initiate an economic upswing by any other means. 
1 D. Lane (Ed.); The Political Economy of Russian Oil. New York - Oxford 1999, p. 82 
11 III.      The Official Beginning of the Transition Process Towards a 
Capitalist Economy and Society in the Yeltsin Period 
Boris Yeltsin's ousting of Gorbachev and his complete assumption of political decision-
making functions signalled the official transition from attempts at internal Soviet-socialist 
reforms to transformation into a capitalist economy and society. 
The economic policy measures taken in the following five years from 1991 to 1996 were also 
marked by trial and error, but their aim was now purposeful transformation into a capitalist 
market economy. The privatisation of state property from 1991 became the key element in 










Before Russia's Congress of People's Deputies Yeltsin announces 
radical economic reforms, including price liberalization, privatisation, 
and tight monetary and fiscal policies. 
Yeltsin appoints Anatoly Chubais minister of privatisation and 
chairman of State Committee for Management of State Property. 
Russian Congress of People's Deputies grants Yeltsin decree powers to 
implement economic reforms. 
Soviet republic leaders agree to abolish all USSR ministries other than 
Defence, Foreign Affairs, Railways, and Nuclear Power. 
Yeltsin becomes prime minister of Russia in addition to president; 
delegates economic reform to deputy prime ministers Gennady 
Burbulis, Yegor Gaidar, and Aleksandr Shokhin. 
Russian decree on social partnership envisions tripartite agreements 
between trade unions, government, and employers. Additional decrees 
empower enterprises to determine their own wage levels and engage in 
import and export activities, and give Yeltsin control of all financial 
and economic activity on Russian territory. 
Presidium of Russian Supreme Soviet unanimously adopts provisional 
privatisation programme. 
Yeltsin issues decree on basic provisions of Programme of Privatisation 
of State and Municipal Enterprises in Russian Federation; decree on 
land reform, mandating transfer of property of collective and state 
farms; and decree on freedom of trade. 
12       1996 
January  Yeltsin removes Chubais from all his positions in government. 
March  Dmitry Vasiliev is appointed chairman of Commission on Securities 
and Capital Market. Chubais joins Yeltsin's presidential campaign team 
as senior aide. 
March 7  Presidential decree entitles any agricultural worker to claim a share of 
land controlled by his or her collective farm, with power to sell, 
mortgage, and bequeath it. 
April 22  Yeltsin signs Law on Securities Market. 
June 19  Yeltsin fires First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets and other 
opponents of reform. 
July 3  Yeltsin wins presidential runoff election by a substantial margin; 
Chubais is appointed presidential chief of staff; Viktor Chernomyrdin is 
confirmed by Duma as new prime minister; Aleksandr Lebed is named 
national security adviser. 
The respective end-of-year balance was as follows: 
1992  18 medium-sized and large companies, 
46,797 small shops, 
2,788,000 apartments, and 
182,787 family farms privatised; 
3,485 industrial enterprises leased; and 503,203 new small businesses founded. 
1993  8,509 medium-sized and large companies, 
80,491 small shops, 
8,592,000 apartments, and 270,000 
family farms privatised; 784,509 new 
small businesses founded. 
1994  16,462 medium-sized and large companies, 
95,538 small shops, 
10,975,000 apartments, and 279,000 
family farms privatised; 779,462 new 
small businesses founded. 
1995  17,937 mid-sized and large companies, 
105,111 small shops, and 
12,118,000 apartments privatised; 
794,889 new small businesses founded. 
15 After the hesitant and contradictory beginnings of an independent middle class in the 
perestroika period, the large-scale privatisation of state owned industrial enterprises, primary 
products, infrastructural facilities, scientific and technical facilities, etc., enlarged the issue of 
economic and human resources for the formation of a new Russian bourgeoisie. 
The economic and social "gear change" in the transition from Gorbachev to Yeltsin is 
associated with the entry on the political scene of Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais and 
their rise to influence and power. Gaidar, the grandson of the legendary author of "Timur and 
His Team" was born into the family of the counter-admiral and military journalist Timur A. 
Gaidar during the 20
th Party Conference of the CPSU in Moscow in 1956. He studied at 
Moscow University, where he gained his doctorate and habilitation. From 1980 to 1987 he 
worked in institutes of the Academy of the Sciences of the USSR. He was financial editor of 
the CPSU organs "Kommunist" and "Pravda" from 1987 to 1991. In early 1991 he became 
director of an Institute for Economic Policy, which he founded at the Academy of Economics 
of the USSR, and already in November 1991 - only three months after Yeltsin had come to 
power - he was appointed both deputy prime minister for economic policy and minister of 
economics and finance of the RFSR. Shortly afterwards he became prime minister. 
Anatoly Chubais, born in 1955, also comes from a military family. He studied at the 
Leningrad Institute of Engineering and Economics where he gained his doctorate and where 
he taught until 1990. In 1990/91 he became first deputy chairman of the Leningrad Executive 
Committee under Mayor Anatoly Sobtchak, and in November 1991 - parallel to Gaidar's 
entry into the government - he became chairman of the "State Committee of the Russian 
Federation for Management of State Assets" with the rank of minister, and from 1992 deputy 
prime minister. 
Immediately after Yeltsin seized power, the "shock therapy" of the official privatisation of 
state property began under the direction of Gaidar and Chubais. The legislation adopted in the 
autumn of 1991 by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation provided the legal basis. 
The people in charge of state economic institutions began with the strategic and - from a 
finance policy point of view - tactical "unscrambling" of the large combines. Efficient 
divisions were hived off under independent management, while those running at a loss were 
left in state ownership. Personal share certificates for all members of the workforce (so-called 
"vouchers"), issued at a nominal price, were intended to make the holders into co-owners by 
means of a sort of "people's share". The rampant inflation during this period rendered the 
nominal value of vouchers de facto valueless for the holders before they were able to function 
as co-owners. They offered them for public sale. In 1993/94 vouchers were sold for a pittance 
in underground stations and public squares. Although management were better "remunerated" 
anyway, they bought up vouchers from their fellow employees directly. With their major 
holdings they were thus able to operate not only as executive managers but, through and by 
means of their voucher packages, also as shareholders of the stock corporations. 
Top and middle management in industry and - thanks to their influence and expertise - many 
high and top ranking ministry officials continued their careers in leading positions in industry 
16 through the holdings in enterprises; i.e., they became independent managers at least with 
regard to capital, and often manager-capitalists. 
Privatisation by voucher was basically completed in 1994. It continued through the classical 
procedures of setting up stock corporations and by auction. The banks, as state institutions 
with specific functions (foreign trade bank, credit cooperative, agricultural bank, etc.), were 
privatised directly, and the state institutions responsible for distributing capital and consumer 
goods were transformed into privately owned commodity exchanges for the product groups 
concerned. Here, too, it was the people who had held influential or executive positions in and 
about these institutions at the right time who became owners or shareholders.
2 
These few examples show where and how the new bourgeoisie in Russia has been recruited: 
primarily from the upper echelons of the former industrial nomenklatura of the CPSU and the 
state apparatus, from the "second and third row" (divisional directors, official junior cadres) 
in the trade and industry ministries and combines, and thus also from sections of the younger 
generation, including the pioneers of the so-called "Komsomol enterprises", as well as from 
among people who had developed into particularly flexible and individual entrepreneurs, 
operating more covertly than overtly with, for, or on behalf of foreign capital. The electronics 
professor Boris A. Beresovsky has become a symbol of this type of career, of the so-called 
"oligarchs."
3 
We are thus dealing not so much with an ambitious, independent, sovereign bourgeoisie 
operating as capitalist entrepreneurs but with a "trade bourgeoisie" whose prime interest is not 
to invest but to secure money, to some extent as representatives of foreign investors. 
The repeatedly reported transfers of money abroad and the mafia-like Russian-international 
economic structures are not to be judged in moral terms. They are a "normal" aspect of an 
early capitalist economic mechanism under the current conditions of globalisation in the 
world economy. 
It is interesting to note that a new type of leading politician has now emerged, especially in 
the economic sphere. Apart from Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais, it includes Grigory 
Yavlinskiy, Sergei Kirienko, Boris Nemzov, and Sergei Shojgu. Alfred Koch (*1961), for 
instance, who recently attracted public attention in connection with the takeover of the 
relatively independent NTW television station by Gasprom, was among the first to be 
involved with Chubais in Leningrad and with the Gaidar-Chubais shock therapy privatisation. 
All were socialised and educated in the Soviet era, but their rise to public and political 
prominence began largely during the perestroika period. All those mentioned were born 
2  Cf. int. al.: 
-  Strategija "Schocka" ili Postepennost? ("Shock Strategy or Progression?") Moscow 1993 
-  Metody Priwatisazii Krupnych Predprijatij (Methods of Privatising Large Concerns). Moscow 1994 
-  St. Kordasch; Privatisierung in Russland. Frankfurt 1997 
-  R. Medvedev; Tschubais i Wautscher (Chubais and the Vouchers). Moscow 1997 
-  A. Siehl; Privatisierung in Russland. Institutioneller Wandel in ausgewählten Regionen. Wiesbaden 1998 
-  A. Chubais (ed.); Priwatisazija Po-Rossijski (Privatisation a la Russe). Moscow 1999 
3  Cf. Klebnikov; Der Pate des Kreml. Boris Beresowski und die Macht der Oligarchen. München 2001 (New 
York 2001) 
17 between 1952 and 1962, and embody the newly emerging type of politician from the nascent 
Russian bourgeoisie. 
Privatisation to date has produced the following ownership structure in Russian industry: 
 
1. Thus, in 1996 no less than 88% of all operating units were in private hands, and for 
2000 up to 92% are expected to be privately owned. However, in 1996 these enterprises 
employed only about 26% of the workforce and accounted for only about 22% of total 
industrial output. No marked rise is expected for 2000 (25% - 28%). Evidently the 
majority of medium-sized enterprises (whatever that might mean for Russia) have been 
fully privatised. If we also consider the information available on the small private sector 
in Russia (see table 3), the main industries affected are mechanical engineering and metal 
working (37% of operating units, 34% of workforce, 31% of production volume in 
million Rb, food and beverages: 12% - 17% - ca. 20%, forestry and wood processing, 
cellulose and paper: 13% - 13% - ca. 9%, light industry: 13 % - 14 % - ca. 7 %). 
18  
This means that, in 1998, these four groups of industries accounted for no less than 76% 
of operating units, about 79% of people in permanent employment, and about 66% of 
output volume of the total small private sector, i.e., of Russian small and medium-sized 
industry. In contrast, only one quarter of operating units, one fifth of the workforce, and 
one third of production volume of all small industry were to be found in power 
generation, metallurgy, chemicals, construction materials, medical equipment, printing, 
etc. 
Overall, some 90% of privatised industrial enterprises are small and medium-sized 
companies, thus accounting for a much lower percentage of employment and output 
volume. Moreover, they are very unevenly distributed both within industrial sectors and 
regionally in the various territories. 
2. In 1996, purely state enterprises accounted officially for only about 3% of all operating 
units. However, they employed about 16% of the industrial workforce and generated 
about 9% of output. The real share of the state in industrial ownership is, however, much 
higher owing to various hybrid forms and the grey area between state and private 
ownership. 
4 "Statistitscheskij Bjulletin", Moscow, Nojabr 1998, N. 9 (48), pp. 5, 6, 7, 9        19 3. Table 2 thus shows that, in 1996, "mixed" and "joint" enterprises accounted for about 
8% of operating units but 59% of employment and no less than 69% of output volume. 
Shareholders include the state, stock corporations, other incorporated firms, banks, labour 
collectives, and private persons. In various legal, half-legal, and illegal forms, this 
conceals foreign capital, on which little information is officially and unofficially 
available. In any case it can be assumed that domestic and/or foreign private capital has 
been invested in these "mixed" and "joint" enterprises in which the state has a majority or 
minority interest. 
For economic, political, and military reasons, the state has a special interest in the 
enterprises comprising the military-industrial complex (MIC). They were and still are 
larger than average and are at a higher scientific and technical standard than industry as a 
whole in the Soviet Union and in present-day Russia. The safeguarding of state security 
interests, economic efficiency, and scientific-technical innovation in these MIC 
enterprises requires - from somewhere or other - capital to operate, innovate, and invest, 
and to uphold the supremacy of the Russian state (see table 4), 
 
5 R. W. Ryvkina, L. J. Kosals, J. A. Simagin; Oboronnye Predprijatija Rossii, Gosudarstwo i Rynok: Problemy 
Sozialno - Ekonomitscheskogo Rassloenija. Moscow 1999, p. 10 
20 In order to survive this balancing act even after privatisation, the number of private 
companies in the MIC has been kept comparatively low ("private companies", Russian 
natural persons, foreign owners), and a wide variety of privatisation constructions are 
practiced, designed to ensure the maintenance of state control. Thus, the state (government, 
state enterprises) holds shares even in privatised companies, and management and labour 
collectives are registered as proprietors. Where the owners are banks and investment funds, 
too, this can mean state dominance. 
In any case, the privatisation of MIC enterprises is another example of the special nature of 
the Russian privatisation process, which has produced a symbiosis between state and private 
capital, Russian and foreign capital, legal, half-legal, and certainly also illegal transactions, as 
well as the personification of all this in economic-political oligarchies. 
This also applies in other economically, politically, and militarily strategic fields such as the 
oil and natural gas industries. The prototype of these privatised and nevertheless state-
dominated enterprises, the natural gas group "Gasprom", stands out with its far-reaching 
political influence among the dominant oligarchies. Victor Chernomyrdin (*1938), chairman 
of "Gasprom", became prime minister of Russia in 1992, remaining in office until March 
1998, the longest term of any head of government since 1985, to return to the Gasprom board 
of directors as "representative of the state" before being appointed Russian ambassador to 
Ukraine in May 2001. The political replacement of the management of the television station 
NTW by the controlling shareholder "Gasprom" in April 2001 is a recent, particularly public 
example of the wielding of societal clout. In loan, debt, and refinancing negotiations with the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, it is therefore both economic access to the 
strategically important natural gas and the socio-political power of the group as a whole that 
repeatedly make "Gasprom" the object of growing desire on the part of these international 
capital institutions. 
4. It is difficult to estimate the proportion of foreign capital in Russia today. But there is good 
reason to believe that, in various forms, it is far higher than recorded by official statistics. The 
question of taxation arrangements, only gradually entering the lawbooks and still unclear or 
even completely unsettled, the issue of profit remittance, and economic and political 
instability have not only caused foreign investors to hold back but have encouraged covert 
forms of commitment. In May 2001, the OECD reached agreement with the Russian 
government on conditions for "the Investment Environment in the Russian Federation. Laws, 
Policies and Institutions." 
The corruption, economic crime, and mafia-like structures prevailing in Russia, which have 
received so much attention in the media, are phenomena of uncertain magnitude within Russia 
and internationally. They are not specific to Russia. Even official statistics estimate that, in 
1998, the black economy in relatively traditional capitalist OECD countries accounted for 
about 15% of gross national product in Germany, 20% - 23% in Sweden and Belgium, and 
28% - 29% in Italy and Greece.
6 The figures have been much higher for national economies 
6 Cf. I. Kjlamkin, L. Timofeew; Tenewaja Rossija Ekonomiko-Soziologitscheskoe Issledowanie. Moscow 2000 - 
Cf. F. Schneider, R. Osterkamp; Schattenwirtschaft in Europa. Unterschiede und Ursachen. Ifo-Schnelldienst, 
2000, N 30 
21 in the throes of socio-economic transformation, with a wide range of legal, half-legal, 
and illegal transitional solutions in national and international transactions. 
The relatively low official foreign investment in the Russian economy (see table 5) is no 
indication of the actual foreign economic relations and the real influence of foreign 
capital. For example, Germany, the United States, Japan, France, and Britain have all 
invested far more in the People's Republic of China than in Russia. Germany has even 
invested more in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland than in Russia.
7 
 
The difference to 100% is shared by various other countries, especially CIS successor states to 
the USSR. 
In   1998  the  absolute total  of recorded  foreign  investment was  $11,773   million,  of 
which $ 9,658 million (82%) were loans of various types. 
7  Cf. P. Fischer; Prjamye Inostrannye Inwestizii dlja Rossii (Direkte Auslandsinvestitionen für Russland). 
Moscow 1999, str. 352, 358, 365, 370, 375, 379, 383 
8  Own compilation on the basis of: 
-  P. Fischer. Prjamye Inostrannye Inwestizii dlja Rossii. Moscow 1999, p. 273 
-  Rossija 1999. Statistitscheskij Sprawotschnik. Moscow 1999, pp. 54, 56 
22  
Table 6 makes an almost sensational revelation about the share of foreign capital in 
industries with growth rates and turnover ratios. For years official and semi-official 
statistics have published the information in the first and, at best, the second column. But 
only the third column given here in conjunction with the first two reveals the actual state 
of affairs. The big difference between the extraordinarily small share (0.8%) in the total 
number of enterprises, the 10% share of total output in economically and politically 
important and profitable sectors, and the high stake in these important areas (40.3%) 
demonstrate more clearly than other relevant statistics how entrenched foreign capital is 
in certain sectors of Russian industry. They include, in particular, strategic natural 
resources (energy sources, their tapping, processing, and the necessary plant and 
equipment construction), metallurgy, wood and wood processing, as well as light industry 
and food industries, which offer short turnaround times and continuity. Thus, the Russian 
market for tobacco products is controlled almost entirely by American, Japanese, and 
British capital. Brewing and confectionary are largely in Dutch, French, and Swiss hands. 
These data are published and officially confirmed (State Committee for Statistics, 
International Centre for Socio-Economic Studies), but foreign involvement is likely to be 
much greater owing to "covert business". Even the "legal shadow economy" (i.e., 
 
9 “Argumenty i Fakty", 2001, N 17, p. 5 
23 excl. drugs, prostitution, etc.) is estimated at 41% of gross national product. The 
international dimensions of the "black economy" are unquestionable; even in such 
"economically civilised countries" as Germany and France it accounts for 14.9%, in 
Japan for 11.1%, in Britain for 13.0%, and in Canada for 16.2%. 
5. We have so far concentrated on the primary products sector (Russia's main source of 
exports), processing industries, the MIC, banking and finance, and sections of the 
wholesale trade. In transport and traffic, the producing sector, science and education, the 
retail trade and services there are many more "spontaneous" forms of privatisation, of 
small businesses and business relationships (malyj bisness), characterised by high 
instability and family self-exploitation, and by a wide range of "legal forms". An 
economically and politically stable middle class can therefore not be expected. 
10 
6. In agriculture, too, no clearly new social structures have developed. In 1999 only 6.9% 
of land used for agriculture was in the care of independent fanners ("fermer") with an 
average of 55 hectares. 
11 
In sum, privatisation in Russia has affected wide areas of the economy, but only rough in-
formation is available on the actual structure and holdings of the new owners. 
Furthermore, the state continues to hold extraordinarily extensive overt and covert 
interests - in the form of capitalised property. Finally, the one hundred biggest Russian 
enterprises are to be found in the fields of oil, natural gas, ferrous metals, nonferrous 
metals, electrical goods, shipping, and the processing of natural resources (petrochemicals 
and wood). High technology and even other processing industries are the exception. In 
other words, the one hundred largest companies in Russia do not reflect the characteristics 
of a modern economy, not even of a developed industrial country (see table7). However 
much progress privatisation "à la Russe" has made, the expectations and hopes of 
economic efficiency have not been met. The reverse is true.
12 Not only the macro-
economic data issued by GOSKOMSTAT but also surveys of business executives and 
politicians indicate that - taking the relatively flourishing oil industry as an example - 
great disillusionment prevails with the present economic system and the economic 
effectiveness of political reforms (see tables 8 and 9). 
10 L. W. Babajeva, G. P. Lapina; Malyj Bisness w Rossii w Epochy Ekonomitscheskich Reform (Small Business 
in Russia in the Era of Economic Reform). Moscow 1997 
-  Maloe Predpriprinimatelstwo w Rossii. Statistitscheskij Sbornik (Small Entrepreneurship in Russia. A 
Statistical Omnibus). Moscow 1999 
-  Srednij Klass w Sowremennom Rossijskom Obschtschestwe (The Middle Class in Present-Day Russian 
Society). Moscow 1999 
-  OECD, The Investment Environment in the Russian Federation Laws, Policies and Investment. Paris 2001 
11 O sostojanii selskogo chosjajstwa Rossisjskoj Federazii w 1996 - 1999 (The State of Agriculture in the 
Russian Federation 1996 - 1999). "Statistitscheskij Bjulletin" N 8 (71), August 2000, str. 9. Cf. et. al.: 
-  A. A. Vosmitel, A. P. Karpov; Stanowlenie Obrasa Schisni Rossiskogo Fermerstwa (The Development of the 
Way of Life of Self-Employed Russian Fanners). Moscow 1994 
-  S. I. Kalugina; Paradoksy Agrarnoj Reformy w Rossii. Soziologitscheskij Analis Transformazionnych 
Prozessow (Paradoxes of Agricultural Reform in Russia. A Sociological Study of the Transformation 
Processes). Novosibirsk 2000 
12 Cf. P. Fischer; Prjamye Inostrannye Inwestizii dlja Rossii (Foreign Direct Investment for Russia). Moscow 




13 D. Lane (ed.); The Political Economy of Russian Oil, New York - Oxford 1999, p. 83 
14 Ibid., p. 83 
26 The reasons are extraordinarily complex, and cannot be systematically discussed in this 
limited context. But at least certain aspects should be mentioned. First, in the survey by Lanes 
mentioned above, the same executives and politicians point with impressive emphasis to the 
diversity of contradictory economic and political, internal and external attempts to influence 
economic decision-making (see tables 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15). 
 
 
27 Table 12    The Influence of Russian Institutions on the Russian Federation's 
Economy: Oil Executives' Views 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Parliament  18  23  39  18  3  2,6  3 
President  3  10  32  34  21  3,6  3 
Government RF  2  7  27  44  21  3,8  3 
Regional authorities  5  18  44  18  16  3,2  3 
State companies and enterprises  13  36  34  15  3  2,6  3 
Private companies  7  23  38  24  8  3,0  5 
N=65  %  %  %  %  %  index  N 
Table 13    The Influence of Russian Institutions on the Russian Federation's 
Economy: Politicians' Views 
Question: What is the extent of the influence on the economic structure of the Russian 
Federation of the following? 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Parliament  17  53  20  10  0  2,2  0 
President  3  17  27  37  17  3,5  0 
Government RF  0  0  47  37  17  3,7  0 
Regional authorities  0  20  47  33  0  3,1  0 
State companies and enterprises  10  47  27  13  3  2,5  0 
Private companies  13  47  7  30  3  2,6  0 
N=30  %  %  %  %  %  index  N 
Key: 
Columns 1 - 5     Five point scale     1 - not influence;    5 - very much influence. Percentages of 
those answering the question. 
Column 6 Average scale 
Column 7 No response (N) 
Source: D. Lane (ed); The Political Economy of Russian Oil; New York - Oxford 1999, pp. 38,39 
28 Table 14    The Influence of Foreign Institutions on the Russian Federation's 
Economy: Oil Executives' Views 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
International organizations (IMF;  5  20  30  33  13  3,4  4 
World Bank)               
Foreign oil companies  13  27  50  10  0  2,6  5 
Government of Western countries  9  23  47  16  5  2,9  8 
N=65  %  %  %  %  %  index  N 
Key: 
Columns 1 - 5     Five point scale     1 - no influence;    5 - very much influence. Percentages of those 
answering the question. 
Column 6 Average scale 
Column 7 No response (N) 
Table 15    The Influence of Foreign Institutions on the Russian Federation's 
Economy: Politicians' Views 
Question: Estimate the degree of influence on the economy of the Russian Federation by 
the following (five-point scale) 
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
International organizations (IMF;  10  0  27  40  23  3,7  0 
World Bank)               
Foreign oil companies  10  23  20  30  17  3,2  0 
Government of Western countries  7  47  27  20  0  2,6  0 
N=65  %  %  %  %  %  index  N 
Key: 
Columns 1 - 5     Five point scale     1 - no influence;    5 - very much influence. Percentages of those 
answering the question. 
Column 6 Average scale 
Column 7 No response (N) 
Source: D. Lane (ed); The Political Economy of Russian Oil; New York - Oxford 
Second, the Russian privatisation programme and, still more so, its political 
implementation, have been oriented almost exclusively on transferring title. Only to a 
limited extent, belatedly, and without regard to a systemic whole has it been directed 
towards a new economic system. 
29 Marx' "Capital" explains the development of the new capitalist private property through 
the historical and systematic development of the capitalist economic system in its mode of 
operation as a whole. The retrospective account of the Russian privatisation programme 
given by the conceptual and practical actors under the leadership of Anatoly Chubais 
(Bojko, Vasilev, Evstafev, Kasakov, Koch, Mostovoj) deals only with privatisation and 
the complicated debates conducted on the subject and not with the associated problems of 
the new economic order.
15 It is "merely" the transformation of large-scale state enterprises 
in a process of "top-down privatisation" (Viniecki). Kornai, like Balcerovicz, by contrast, 
have from the outset embraced a concept of privatisation that includes creating the 
economic prerequisites for the development and operation of private companies.
16 Cohen 
und Schwartz put it as follows. "Ownership structure is an important element in modern 
capitalism, but it is only one of many institutions which influence corporate behavior and 
performance." 
17 
Last but not least, it should not be forgotten that the new capitalist development of Russia 
-whether since 1985 or after 1991 - is no more than a "second in history" compared with 
the centuries of development that Britain, France, Germany, and the United States have 
experienced. In such an "historical instant" no socio-economic mechanism could have 
developed, even if theoretically consistent concepts had been available and coherent 
practical action taken. 
The quest for such theoretical concepts and coherent political action is all the more 
important now and for the future. 
15 Cf. A Chubais (red.); Priwatisazija Po-Rossiskij. Moscow 1999 
16 Cf. J. Kornai; The Principles of Privatization in Eastern Europe. Discussion Paper N 1567. Cambridge (Mass.) 
1991 
-  L. Balcerovicz; Sozialism, Capitalism, Transformation. Budapest 1995, russ. Moscow 1999 
-  E. Siehl; Privatisierung in Russland. Wiesbaden 1998 
17 St. Cohen, A. Schwartz; The Tunnel at the End of the Light: Privatization in Eastern Europe. Berkeley 1992, 
p.16 
30 IV.      Emergence and Characteristics of the New Russian Economic Elites 
The decades of economic and social development in the Soviet Union and the nature of 
Russian privatisation have determined how new economic subjects (in various types of self-
employment) and, in particular, how new self-employed and managerial business elites have 
developed. 
I have already discussed the many-faceted beginnings of new independent middle classes 
since perestroika ("minor privatisation") and the "Komsomol enterprises" with their 
extensive, independent powers. There was no alternative to the transfer that began with large-
scale privatisation from 1991 of powers and rights over property to the former managers of 
major concerns, to ministry officials and functionaries in subordinate state institutions and in 
the economic sections of the various bodies and at various levels of the CPSU. These people 
had the indispensable expertise, insider knowledge, and personal networks, and faced no 
structural challenge from alternative counter-elites. The key new business elites in Russia 
have been recruited largely from among Soviet nomenklatura  cadres. A degree of 
differentiation between areas (e.g., the military-industrial complex on the one hand, the media 
on the other) should be mentioned. The recruitment pattern shown by Lane's sample from the 
oil industry, banking and finance is typical (see table 16). 
 
Table 16 The Origin of Economic Elites; by Sector 
Occupation/Status Oil  Banking/Finance 
 
Industrial executives  54  11 
(chief engineer, factory director)     
Professions (doctor, lawyer, lecturer)  9  14 
Students  7  14 
Officials (in Soviet economic     
organizations, e. g., Gosbank)  4  21 
Researchers  0  9 
Entrepreneurs  7  5 
Government position holders  8  10 
Party and Komsomol apparatus members  6  8 
Full/candidates CPSU CC members  0*  7 
Others  5  7 
Total  100  100 
Positions held August 1981 - December 1988. Figures refer to percentage of time spent by all 
members of elite in the given occupational category 
* Expressed as zero due to rounding 
18 D. Lane (ed.); The Political Economy of Russian Oil. New York - Oxford 1999, p. 80 
31 It is striking that in the more traditional oil industry more than half the members of the new 
business elites come from the former management of the industry, whereas in the new 
banking and finance system, which by comparison has grown and diversified, only about 21% 
come from the existing state financial sector, the majority being recruited from a wide variety 
of other sectors. 
This has been shown even more clearly by the studies I have undertaken together with my 
colleague Oskar Vogel. The data basis was the 2000 edition of the Russian "Who is Who?". 
While in 1993 the first edition recorded a very small business elite, the 2000 edition, which 
lists a total of 15,000 people, identifies 2,530 prominent figures in the Russian economy.
19 
They include not only the leading Russian politicians in the field, but also the presidents and 
chief executives of large stock corporations, entrepreneurs - owners and managers -, business 
people from a broad range of sectors including extractive and processing industries, the new 
banking and finance sector, science and technology, agriculture, the new media, and services. 
Biographical data is uniformly structured, and, in comparison with other international "Who 
is Who" publications, is detailed and comprehensive. Information is provided on both 
important social structure aspects and on the careers of the people concerned from the Soviet 
period before and during perestroika, and in the Yeltsin period from 1991 to 1999. Table 17 
gives an overview of the 2,350 leading personalities in Russian economic life, differentiated 
in terms of age group and activity in the various sectors. It shows the percentages, and the 
absolute numbers of people from each age group and sector at the end of the columns and 
lines. 
19Kto est Kto w Rossii i w blischnem sorubesche. Moscow 1993. Sowremenija Politischeskaja Istorija Rossii 
(1985 - 1999 gody). Tom 2: Liza Rossii. Moscow 2000. 
32  
33 Table 18 shows the share of women separately. There are so few involved that calculating 
percentages would be pointless. Only absolute figures are given, percentages being given only 
for whole age groups and sectors. At least in the lower age groups and in the newer sectors 
(banking and finance, media, and services) the proportion of women is slightly higher than in 
older age groups and traditional industries. 
 
34 On the basis of the total information, figures 1 to 8 present specific characteristics. 
Figure 1 shows characteristic stations in the careers of the older generation of industrial 
managers (skilled worker, technical college studies, political socialisation in Komsomol and 
Party positions, managerial positions from middle to top levels in major enterprises, 
sometimes positions in high party and parliamentary bodies, in and after privatisation 
entrepreneurs and managers, members and advisers of political parties and groups, trade 
associations, parliaments, and state institutions). They are most strongly represented in large 
industrial enterprises, in extractive industries (oil, gas), and in the military-industrial complex. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate characteristics of the business elites in banking and finance and in 
agriculture in a different way. The pattern is the same as in industry. 
Apart from the specificities of the banking and finance profession, it is striking that this 
"new" sector offers far more younger people and somewhat more women career 
opportunities. 
Figures 4 to 7 show examples of professional, educational, and political stations in the lives of 
the managers and politicians Chernomyrdin, Beresovski, Chubais, and Kirienko. Coming 
from different generations (born respectively in 1938, 1946, 1955, and 1962), they embody 
the unity and mobility of education and qualifications, industrial management and political 
responsibility in the highest government and party positions in present-day Russian 
capitalism. 
Finally, figure 8 compares the age structure of business elites in industry, in science and 
technology, and in the military-industrial complex with those in service industries, finance 
management, and the media. The second group, which includes the newer sectors of the 
economy, there is a markedly higher proportion of younger people. This is also the case with 
the female minority, again shown as a whole. 
At the present time it is not possible to give a final assessment of Russian capitalism. It is still 
in its infancy. Even privatisation as a property relationship has only been realised at the 
formal, legal level, and still needs to be given political-economic and sociological form. The 
business elites, too, are characterised by a high measure of both continuity and discontinuity. 
And although the passage of political leadership from Yeltsin to Putin at the beginning of the 
21
st century was a signal of the will to apply law and order to the chaotic capitalism of the 
90s, the outcome is still limited to stronger involvement by the Russian state. 
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